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Tie that bind 
I have been asked to write a few words in reply to the review essays which 
appear in this volume in response to Kangaroo Courts and the rule of law – the 
legacy of modernism. It is more than appropriate; it is a privilege to have critics; any 
critics, to be honest, since a hostile reader is infinitely preferable to no reader at all, 
but especially ones as wise and generous as these. I have learnt more in reading 
their responses to my work than I am able to summarize here, but I wish to thank 
them for the honor they have done me in engaging with my book as carefully and as 
vigorously as they have. 
It is more than appropriate, it is a privilege that this commentary should 
appear in the journal Eunomia, that is, a publication devoted not to order or value as 
such but to ‘good order’, to the question of the relationship that ought to pertain 
between harmony and order, governance and good governance. These questions 
have been at the centre of debates about justice and law for thousands of years. Not 
so very long ago the dispute between HLA Hart and Lon Fuller centred precisely on 
such questions. Fuller said that the ‘oughtness’ of law implied not just order but ‘good 
order’; Hart demurred and pointed out that just because law was a structure of 
obligation did not make it necessarily moral. ‘The baffled poisoner’, he pointed out, 
might equally say that he ‘ought’ to have given her a second dose. The two legal 
thinkers divided precisely on the question of law and eunomics. 
Many hundreds of years earlier, Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s mural was given pride 
of place in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. The panoramic Allegory of Good 
Government, and its companion piece the Effects of Good Government, might be 
said to be the visual representation of eunomia, indeed perhaps even, in its strictest 
sense, its constitutive moment. Lorenzetti, as long ago as 1339, did not produce a 
representation of order, diagrams of lines of authority, summaries of rules, or 
catalogues of principles. On the contrary he portrayed in the most vivid manner a 
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complex web of relationships in which can be seen and felt a fluid and dynamic 
harmony, in which the ropes that bind us each to each other are kept in precisely the 
right balance of tension and release to allow the community to flourish. Lorenzetti’s 
images give us a feeling that the most successful law is a dance, an oscillation, and 
a rhythm. 
Professor Nabaskues is right to rebuke me for positing too crude a distinction 
between style and plot, form and content. As he says, they are indissolubly 
connected, and we can see in Lorenzetti, for example, how closely the style and feel, 
the emotional register of his painting is associated with the political principles he 
avows. The rhythmic feet of the ensemble seen dancing in the streets of his ideal city 
are not merely celebrating or ornamenting the Sienese polis; they are literally 
constituting it by their relations, by their feelings, and by their movements. But I 
cannot help feeling that the difference between Professor Nabaskues and myself, on 
this point as on most of his remarks, is one of emphasis. There is no difference 
between form and content, true; but it seems to me that a great deal of law and 
literature writing in recent years seems almost willfully ignorant of just this point. In 
the process it has given remarkably short shrift to the affective and stylistic elements 
of prose writing. In a strange paradoxical twist, literature is too often reduced, by 
legal writers, to a set of principles to be extracted from the teeth of the text like a ratio 
from a court decision. One of the tasks of Kangaroo Courts was to bring to bear a 
more holistic and less reductive analysis of works of literature. 
So too the distinction I make between a way of reading the novel which aims 
at drawing out its ‘moral’ and a way of reading the novel which is more pluralistic and 
dialogic in orientation, is no doubt overdrawn. Professor Nabaskues is right to say 
that a novel could hardly avoid having some connection with morals, both in terms of 
its characters and its readers. But there is a world of difference between saying that 
all characters have morals and saying that all novels have ‘a moral’. Yet this 
difference is often ignored by writers in the field. The former may be true; the latter is 
definitely false. In Lawrence, as I have tried to show, the error is a fatal one. If one 
looks for the ‘moral’ in the story, one will consistently miss both the counter-points to 
which it gives voice, and the overall tension, disagreement, and (as Lawrence puts it) 
‘polarity’ that his books, Kangaroo in particular, seek to stage and not resolve. The 
moral reading of a novel, the sense that it is, as George Eliot put it, a kind of secular 
sermon, found its apotheosis in nineteenth century realism and in the narrative 
didacticism of writers like Eliot, Dickens, and Tolstoy. Not, as Bakhtin and 
Nabaskues point out, in Dostoevsky. The ‘modernist movement’, I insist, dismantled 
the moralistic novel though of course never ignoring the moral elements of its 
discourse or the discourse of its characters. That is not the same thing and it seems 
to me critical to a reconstruction of the field of law and literature to think about what 
that moral ambivalence and poly-vocal instability does to the question of justice and 
the idea of the rule of law. 
Again, the disagreement between Professor Nabaskues and myself on this 
issue is surely one of emphasis. He correctly insists that justice ‘is not a synthesis, it 
is a decision, it implies taking a stance, deciding on a particular issue.’ The real task 
of my book was to try and think through this very modernist predicament, that is, the 
distinctive combination of contingency and necessity that shrouds and shadows our 
modern experience of legal judgment. The question goes back to turn of the century 
modernism, and is still intensely current. How can we accept the loss of 
transcendence in law and value, and yet not concede – as the nihilists, Dadaists, and 
Crits insist, that there is nothing to legal judgment but some form of partisan politics. 
That is the real question that Lawrence was struggling with then and that we are still 















the process to come up with some kind of coherent answer myself. It seems to me 
that it was and is possible to embrace –really embrace, not just with reluctance but 
with alacrity– the uncertainty and the polyphonic discourse of modern law; while still 
finding a defensible articulation of the rule of law and the value of legal judgment 
therein. 
The alternative to finding a way through the thickets of modernism is to give 
in to fantasies of transcendence or to despair. Professor Nabaskues rather nicely, 
and sharply, disagrees with my reading of the tradition of popular culture heroes who 
take on the law in the interests of justice. He points out how strongly the superhero is 
limited –not by the laws of physics or probability, to be sure, but by moral values and 
by ‘the same principles defended by the law.’ On this reading, Superman or Batman 
and the rest are agents of legality (albeit in disguise). I see the point but in the end I 
don’t agree. A recent edition of Law Text Culture curated by Dr Luis Gomez-Romero, 
my second critic in this volume, shows how much the genre of the superhero gives 
voice to the urgent alienation of the modern world, and in particular modern youth 
culture, from the institutional structures of modernity. On the one hand Superman 
and his ilk are needed because of the enervating impotence of the legal system. On 
the other hand, their adventures stage a dramatic encounter between ‘law’ and 
‘justice’ every bit as uncompromising as the encounter between Superman and 
Luthor, whose name you will recall is lex; or between Batman and the Joker, whose 
exploitation of the machinery of institutions for his own anarchic purposes seems 
uncannily, it seems to me, legalistic. A lawyer is a joker in an expensive suit. Indeed, 
the only exception to this opposition between superhero and legality is the Canadian 
superhero Captain Canuck. He has no super powers at all. He turns his captives 
over to the authorities. At his most desperate, he holds a press conference. And as a 
superhero he has been almost a complete dead loss. The only law Captain Canuck 
ever broke was the law of the genre. A superhero must be an outcast and an out-
law. He is, in the most philosophically rigorous sense of the word, the supplement to 
the legal system, its pharmakon, poison and antidote. 
Dr Gomez-Romero’s own work on popular culture shows just how deep-
seated the yearning for a rescue figure has been in the discursive history of modern 
law. And in his reply to my recent work, he takes this argument in a surprising new 
direction. He pays me what I think is the ultimate compliment, that of applying my 
methods and approaches to a different novel and a different social context. The 
reading he produces by applying my methodology to Lawrence’s next book, set in 
Gomez-Romero’s own homeland of Mexico, is nuanced and powerful. He justly 
chastises me for a static reading of Lawrence limited to one small encounter, 
Australia –my own homeland. Like the good student of literature he is, Gomez-
Romero inevitably asks, ‘and then what?’ And what happened next was Lawrence’s 
encounter with Mexico in The Plumed Serpent, in which his consistent interest in 
questions of law and justice, myth, power and freedom, are given new tests under 
new circumstances. 
In neither case does Lawrence indulge the amour propre of his guides, but 
instead tries to absorb local knowledge ‘warts and all.’ If this sometimes makes for 
disconcerting reading, Lawrence’s critical assessments seem only to have gained 
force over time. Gomez-Romero demonstrates just how the different contexts in 
these two countries leads to different tragedies. At the same time, reading 
Lawrence’s two novels highlights just how uncannily their contemporary 
circumstances seem to continue their historical arcs. In other words, Lawrence’s 
literary mythologies, now one hundred years old, continue to speak to these 
countries’ twenty-first century predicament. The tragedy for Australia in the 1920s 
was how alien the language of reactionary modernism seemed to the diffident 
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instrumentalism of the place. Modern-day Australia seems still to sustain an almost 
unparalleled culture of hedonism and anti-intellectualism. But the tragedy of Mexico 
was just how plausible the language of reactionary modernism seemed. Modern-day 
Mexico seems still to combine a culture of savagery illuminated –and sometimes 
clouded– by a passionate intellectualism. The writer Donald Horne famously 
christened Australia ‘the lucky country’ —he did not mean it as a compliment; he 
meant it as a curse. The curse of Mexico, on the other hand, is that it is not a lucky 
country. Australia’s luck has led to a dull complacency that enrages a good many of 
its citizens. Of Mexico, say what you will, neither dullness nor complacency spring to 
mind. 
Gomez-Romero’s critique of Kangaroo Courts takes the argument about 
Lawrence and law in new and exciting directions. At the same time, he identifies an 
important objection to my own work. For Gomez-Romero, each place treads a 
distinct path through modernity and with different consequences for the relationship 
between polarity, uncertainty, and the rule of law. My book concluded by defending a 
culture of uncertainty, of unresolved conflicts, and of judgment as an exercise in the 
provisional. I saw these necessary attributes as virtues of a highly social 
understanding of the rule of law. ‘Justice,’ I wrote, ‘is like the rest of us. Its frailty is its 
strength.’ But as Gomez-Romero points out, ‘the critique of the rule of law… cannot 
function without a basis of legality, and of a civil society in which stability and social 
commitment are taken for granted.’ In short, in a place like Mexico in the 1920s 
where untrammelled violence was normalized through myth and history, positivism 
was a dream not a nightmare. Walter Benjamin’s divine violence likewise seems not 
creative but destructive. In Australia, Lawrence explored the fantasy of what such 
violence might accomplish. In Mexico he witnessed what it actually did accomplish in 
the inevitable hands not of gods but of men. In Kangaroo, Ben Cooley’s desire was 
naïve and deluded; in The Plumed Serpent, the parallel figure Huitzilopochtli did not 
so much share it as exploit it for his own cynical purposes. Gomez-Romero 
persuasively reminds us that ‘modernity is not unique, and its crises are plural. In this 
non-Eurocentric sense, modernities entail several competing master narratives and 
cultural contextualizations that result in multiple legal crises.’ The implications and 
resonances of these crises take very different forms in different places. 
At the same time, there is I think a commonality which is worth emphasizing. 
Again, the commonality is not substantive but methodological. Granted, the 
contingency and polarity of the rule of law cannot and should not be applied 
universally. But beneath that claim lies another –of the relationship between literary 
and cultural traditions and legal resources, of the ways in which context determines 
meaning, and of the role of affect in the constitution of law. I struggled in this book to 
reclaim the important relationship between law and literature while at the same time 
reconfiguring it– not as a short cut to moral values but as a long cut to a dialogue 
about justice in which a much wider community would meaningfully participate. 
Reconnecting law and literature will give legal values back their particular histories 
and their particular contexts, and will help communities as a whole participate in what 
to make of -and out of- those histories and contexts. 
Around the world, many international organizations promote ‘the rule of law’, 
especially when it comes to third world countries. But very often what they mean by 
this is the application of a particular set of institutional structures and forms. What 
they don’t very often mean is any sense of public engagement, participation, or 
transparency of process. I think in trying to fashion legal institutions in challenging 
contexts, whether we are talking about Mexico or Australia or somewhere else in the 
twenty-first century, we should pay far more attention to their literary and aesthetic 















narratives, and social relations in complex and meaningful ways. D.H. Lawrence saw 
that too; he saw the ways in which narratives, speech patterns, and mythology gave 
people resources through which to engage in political action. He was often highly 
critical of the use and abuse of them, from England patriotic rhetoric during the first 
world war to Mexican revolutionary rhetoric after it. But his response was not to 
dismiss or despair of our mythic lives, as to find more sensitive ways of intuiting its 
force and more reflective ways of responding to it. In a very general sense both 
Kangaroo and The Plumed Serpent concern mythologies and the modern world. 
Civil society, as Dr Gomez-Romero insists, is the essential foundation to legal 
discourse. It finds its deepest roots and its highest branches in literature and the 
creative arts. Look again at Lorenzetti’s Effects of Good Government. One wonders if 
the title — which, after all, was not Lorenzetti’s — is apt. This is not a question that 
anyone has thought much about. But are those dancers really just an ‘effect’ of 
government? Or are they rather and more deeply its cause? Hand holding hand, foot 
echoing foot in time with the music. Moving through space and time, working 
pleasurably together, separately but in pursuit of a common goal. In what sense -
culturally, historically, emotionally- can this be reduced to an ‘effect’? The rhythmic 
harmony and the social relations of trust Lorenzetti’s dancers literally embody are not 
epiphenomenal to civil society but intimately bound up with it. The dance makes the 
law. 
